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Abstract
We analyze experimental survey data, with a random split into respondents who
get an open-ended question on the amount of total family consumption - with follow-
up unfolding brackets (of the form: is consumption $X or more?) for those who
answer “don’t know” or “refuse” - and respondents who are immediately directed to
unfolding brackets. In both cases, the entry point of the unfolding bracket sequence
is randomized. Allowing for any type of selection into answering the open-ended or
bracket questions, a nonparametric test is developed for errors in the answers to the
first bracket question that are different from the usual reporting errors that will also
affect open-ended answers. Two types of errors are considered explicitly: anchoring
and yea-saying. We reject the joint hypothesis of no anchoring and no yea-saying.
Once yea-saying is taken into account, we find no evidence of anchoring at the entry
point.
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1 Introduction
Item non-response in survey data is a well-known problem, particularly if questions relate
to sensitive information that respondents are not willing to provide or to information that
respondents do not know exactly and find hard to estimate. Examples are the values of
household assets like saving accounts or stocks and bonds, or the value of total family income
or consumption. Item non-response becomes particularly problematic if the information is
not missing at random, i.e., if the probability of not responding correlates with the amount
in question conditional on a set of covariates. See, e.g., Manski (1989, 1995) and Little and
Rubin (2002, Chapter 15).
Follow-up questions are often used to reduce the loss of information due to item non-
response by extracting partial, categorical, information from initial non-respondents (cf.,
e.g., Juster and Smith, 1997). Particularly in telephone interviews where it is difficult to
show range cards on which respondents can choose in one step from a larger number of
categories, unfolding brackets can be used to collect banded information. For example, a
respondent who answers “don’t know” or “refuse” to a question on total family consumption
in the past month then gets the question “Can you say whether it was $2000 or more?” If
the answer is affirmative, the next question is “Was it $5000 or more?” etc.
The majority of initial non-respondents typically appear to answer one or more unfolding
bracket questions, implying that unfolding brackets indeed lead to additional information.
Several experiments, however, have shown that the distribution of the categorical answers
obtained in an unfolding bracket design depends on the order in which the bracket points
are presented. For example, if the first question is “Was it $ 2000 or more?” i.e., the entry
point is $2000, the distribution gives more weight to the high consumption outcomes than
if the entry point were $500. A psychological explanation is that if people are unsure about
the exact amount, the entry point serves as an anchor that provides some information about
this amount. This phenomenon is known as anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
The literature shows that anchoring exists and becomes more prominent the more un-
certain the respondent is about the exact answer (see, e.g., Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995).
In order to use the answers to unfolding bracket questions for meaningful analysis, the pos-
sibility of an anchoring bias needs to be taken into account. Several models for what the
answers to bracket questions look like if they suffer from anchoring have been introduced and
estimated, using different sources of experimental data with random entry points. Examples
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are Hurd et al. (1998), Herriges and Shogren (1996), and Cameron and Quiggin (1994). A
comparison between competing models for anchoring, however, has not yet been performed.
A second source of incorrect answers in an unfolding bracket design is acquiescence or
“yea- saying,” the phenomenon that people have a tendency to answer yes rather than no
(Schuman and Presser, 1996; Hurd, 1999). For example, the number of “yes” answers to the
question “Was it $2000 or more?” will be higher than the number of “no” answers to the
question “Was it less than $2000?” The design of the data used in our experiment makes
the answers vulnerable to yea-saying.
Both anchoring and yea-saying are framing effects in the sense of Schwarz et al. (1985).
Bracket questions may induce uncertain respondents to adjust their expectations and give an
answer that does not correspond to the estimate they had before going into brackets. Strack
and Mussweiler (1997) conjecture that there would be no anchoring if subjects had absolutely
certain knowledge. Schwarz et al. (1985, p. 394) advise to use open-ended answers to avoid
this kind of framing effects, but this has the drawback of substantial non-response as we
discussed above. None of this implies that open-ended answers are error-free - they reflect
the respondents’ initial point estimates of the amount in question and can themselves suffer
from underreporting, focal point bias, etc. The issue here is whether bracket questions induce
new errors, implying that a bracket answer does not always correspond to the respondent’s
estimate that would be reported in an open-ended answer.
In this paper, we do not analyze reporting errors in open-ended questions but focus on
testing for anchoring and acquiescence errors induced by the bracket questions. We use
experimental data on household consumption from the AHEAD 1995 survey described in
Hurd et al. (1998) in which the sample is randomly split in respondents starting with an
open-ended question and respondents who immediately go into an unfolding bracket sequence
with random entry point. We first develop a test for the null hypothesis that answers to the
first bracket question correspond exactly to the respondents’ estimates given in open-ended
answers, allowing for any form of selective response behavior, i.e., for an arbitrary correlation
between whether an open-ended answer or bracket answer is given and the respondent’s best
estimate of the consumption amount. We find that this null hypothesis is rejected. We then
show that a very simple model of yea-saying can explain why the hypothesis is rejected,
suggesting that yea-saying rather than anchoring is the source of the problem. We also show
that yea-saying correlates with characteristics in a way that is in line with the notion that
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more uncertainty leads to more yea-saying.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the existing literature of anchoring
and yea-saying is summarized. In Section 3, we describe the experimental data. Section 4
explains the non-parametric test when full non-respondents - those who neither give an
open-ended answer, nor a bracket answer - are discarded. The test is applied in Section 5.
Section 6 takes the full non-respondents into account, using the notion of worst-case bounds,
as in Manski (1989). Section 7 incorporates simple ways of “fixed probability” anchoring and
acquiescence, to try and disentangle the effects of anchoring and yea-saying. This section also
presents some estimates of yea-saying for different groups, defined by, for example, education
level or memory skills. Section 8 concludes.
2 Anchoring Models and Acquiescence Bias
Psychological experiments provide extensive evidence of subjects’ cognitive illusion when
dealing with uncertainty (Rabin, 1998), such as context effects - effects produced by the
nature of the questionnaire such as the wordings of questions or the order in which they
are presented (Sudman, Bradburn and Schwarz, 1996). A prominent example is anchoring
- the phenomenon that responses are influenced by cues contained in the questions. A
psychological explanation is that the respondent treats the question as a problem solving
task and uses the information in the question as a cue, seeking a framework to construct a
correct solution. Using the information in the question may induce respondents to update
their initial (point) estimate. This should be more important if the respondent is more
uncertain or knows less about the topic, but evidence of anchoring has even been found
among experts (Northcraft and Neale, 1987).
An intuitively appealing anchoring model is the fixed-point model used by Herriges and
Shogren (1996), O’Connor et al. (1999), and Hurd et al. (2001). It assumes that respondents
update their beliefs about an unknown amount if new information arrives. In this model, the
entry point B1 (the amount mentioned in the first bracket question) serves as an anchor for
follow-up questions. The respondents have an initial point estimate Ŷ that can be interpreted
as a mean or other location measure of the respondent’s prior distribution. In the second
bracket question, respondents do not compare the bracket point B2 given in the question
to Ŷ , but to their updated estimate, a weighted mean Ŷ ∗ = (1 − γ)Ŷ + γB1, for some γ
3
between 0 and 1. The intuition is that a respondent who is uncertain about the true amount
Y , sees the entry point B1 as informative about Y and adjusts the initial estimate towards
B1. Herriges and Shogren (1996) apply their model to data on willingness to pay for water
quality improvement and find an estimate for γ of 0.36, with standard error 0.14. They also
discuss the possibility that γ varies with Ŷ (or Y ) and B1. An important feature of the
fixed-point model is that answers to the first bracket question are not affected: although the
respondent’s initial estimate of the true amount will be drawn towards the entry point, it
remains on the same side.
Results of Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) and Green et al. (1998) suggest that respon-
dents already give biased answers to the first bracket question. For estimates of objective
quantities as well as willingness to pay for public goods, they find that, for high entry point
values, the proportion of bracket respondents who report that the amount is larger than the
entry point exceeds the fraction of open-ended answers larger than the entry point.
Hurd et al. (1998) specify a parametric model that captures this phenomenon in a
symmetric way, biasing probabilities smaller than 0.5 upwards and probabilities larger than
0.5 downward. In this model respondents do not compare their initial estimate Ŷ to the
entry point B1, but instead compare Ŷ +ε1 to B1, where ε is a mean zero error term, assumed
to be normally distributed and independent of other components of the model. Hurd et al.
(1998) use the same device also at follow-up bracket questions, with independent errors that
can have different variances. They call their model a gating model, in which respondents
have to pass a number of gates to reach their final bracket answer. At each gate k, new
noise is introduced, in the form of an error term εk, independent of Ŷ and previous errors
ε1, . . . , εk−1.
Somewhat similar, though not yet applied in this context, are the models for binary
regression with contaminated data (e.g., Copas, 1988) or misclassification (e.g. Hausman et
al., 1998). Assume that with some fixed “gating” probability P [Gat], people give an answer
that does not correspond to their initial estimate Ŷ . For answers to the question ”Is the
amount B1 or more?” this implies P [“no”] = P [Ŷ < B1](1 − P [Gat]) + P [Ŷ ≥ B1]P [Gat]
and P [“yes”] = P [Ŷ ≥ B1](1− P [Gat]) + P [Ŷ < B1]P [Gat]. If P [Gat] does not depend on
Ŷ and is thus the same whether the initial estimate of the true amount is larger or smaller
than the entry point, the reported probability that the amount is at least B1 will be smaller
than P [Ŷ ≥ B1] if P [Ŷ ≥ B1] > 0.5 and larger than P [Ŷ ≥ B1] if P [Ŷ ≥ B1] < 0.5.
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Yea-saying or acquiescence is a well-known phenomenon with a long history in cognitive
psychology. It refers to a tendency to agree with statements but also extends to yes/no
questions (Jackman, 1973). Schuman and Presser (1996, Chapter 8) give an overview of
theoretical explanations in the psychology literature. The first is a personality trait, that can
be treated like any other personality trait in psychology (Couch and Keniston, 1960). The
second characterizes acquiescence as a form of deference shown by low-status respondents
towards interviewing staff (Lenski and Leggett, 1960). The third sees acquiescence as the
tendency of poorly educated people with low cognitive abilities to be uncritical of statements
made by the interviewers (Campbell et al., 1960). Similar to anchoring, it can be expected
that acquiescence is more prevalent if the questions are less precise or the respondent is more
uncertain about the correct answer.
A direct test of yea-saying on an economic issue is performed by Hurd (1999). He uses
experimental data from the 1996 wave of the Health and Retirement Study, a representative
sample of the US population aged 54-64 with their spouses. Respondents were asked “About
how much could you sell your home for in today’s housing market?” They were forced into
brackets and randomly assigned to an entry point E ($50,000, $100,000 or $150,000) and to
one of three questions: “Would it be more than E,” “Would it be E or more?” or “Would it be
less than E or E or more?” Hurd found that the first two (unbalanced) formats led to many
more “yes” answers than the third (balanced) format for non-financial respondents, while
there was hardly any difference for financial respondents (i.e., the person in the household
most knowledgeable in financial matters). He interpreted this as evidence of acquiescence
related to uncertainty.
Acquiescence bias is also discussed in the willingness-to-pay (WTP) literature. Boyle et
al. (1998) find evidence of yea-saying for bid levels in the upper tail by comparing open-
ended answers and bracket answers on WTP for a moose hunting site. On the other hand,
Frykblom and Shogren (2000) used experimental data to compare open-ended and discrete
choice answers on students’ WTP for a specific book and found no differences.
3 The AHEAD Wave 2 Consumption Experiment
The data we used are described in detail in Hurd et al. (1998). The AHEAD panel (Assets
and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old) is roughly representative for the US population
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over 70 and their spouses. In the descriptive statistics and estimations throughout this paper,
we use the sample weights and primary sampling units provided with the public use file to
account for the multi-level design features of the data (see the documentation on the HRS
web site). The second wave was done in 1995, mainly by telephone interviews. At the end
of the regular survey, regular AHEAD participants were asked to complete an additional
experimental module. In case of proxy interviews (901 interviews with a relative or other
person answering the questions on behalf of a respondent who is unable to do so), the
experimental module was skipped. Of the respondents asked, about 80% were willing to do
the experimental module and attained the questions on consumption (a few dropped out
during the module before getting to the consumption questions). This is the sample used by
Hurd et al. (1998) and for our study. We do not address selection into participation in the
experimental module. Thus our findings refer to respondents willing and able to sit through
a long interview including the experimental module and are not necessarily representative
for the complete US population of 70 and older.
The participants in the experimental module were randomly assigned to one of seven
groups of approximately equal size. All groups got some questions on household consump-
tion, but the question format differed across the groups. Three groups (sample I) started
with an open question: “How much did your household spend on consumption in the past
month?” Those who answered “don’t know” or “refuse” then got unfolding bracket ques-
tions, with a different entry point E for each group. The first unfolding bracket question
was: “Would the amount be $E or more in the past month?” with E = 500, E = 1000 or
E = 2000. If a respondent answered “don’t know” or “refuse” to a bracket question, the
sequence was stopped. The other four groups (sample II) immediately were given bracket
questions, with different entry points for the four groups ($500, $1000, $2000 and $5000).
This sample consists of 4885 observations. About 2.5% of them did not give an answer
to either an open-ended question or a follow-up or direct bracket question, see Appendix
A; these observations are discarded for now (but will be incorporated in Section 6). This
leaves 4759 observations. About 44.5% of these (sample I) started with an open question.
Almost two thirds of them gave an open-ended answer (1416 observations). The remaining
681 gave at least one bracket answer. The first panel of Table 1 presents the fractions with
consumption less than each of the entry point values in the open-ended answers and according
to the follow-up bracket answers, separately for the three groups in sample I with different
entry points. There are several explanations for differences between open-ended answers and
6
bracket answers and between bracket answers with different entry points. High consumption
families could be more concerned about their privacy and less willing to give a precise number,
i.e., open-ended answers could under-represent high amounts. Moreover, respondents may
make different mistakes in open-ended answers and bracket answers. The differences between
the distributions of bracket responses for the three entry points suggest that some bracket
answers are affected by the (randomly assigned) entry point, but significance levels are rather
low due to the small numbers of observations.
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the distributions for the immediate bracket respon-
dents by entry point. A salient feature is that the distribution shifts with the entry point.
In this case the numbers of observations are much larger and most of the differences are
significant. The studies discussed in the previous section provide several explanations for
these differences. Fixed-point anchoring affects the answers to bracket questions from the
second bracket question onwards, with the entry point in the first bracket question acting as
an anchor. This makes intuitive sense and is well-established in the literature, which is why
it is not the issue of the current study. Fixed-point anchoring does not affect the answer to
the first bracket question. In this paper we focus on errors in answers to the first bracket
question. We do not analyze the answers to later bracket questions, avoiding the need to
model fixed-point anchoring.
Our nonparametric testing strategy is illustrated in Figure 1, which is largely derived
from the numbers in Table 1. The solid line is the empirical distribution of open-ended
answers. The other curves use only the answers to the first bracket question to estimate
the distributions for the samples of immediate bracket respondents and follow-up bracket
respondents. For example, for the immediate bracket respondents, the fraction of households
with consumption less than $2000 is based upon the group of immediate respondents who
got $2000 as entry point – the point (20,0.688) on the short-dashed curve in Figure 1.
The three distributions in Figure 1 differ if non-response to the open-ended question is
non-random (i.e., missing values are not completely missing at random, see Little and Rubin,
2002). In the sub-sample of sample I that gave an open-ended answer, 82.6% report con-
sumption less than $2000, compared to 77.3% in the sub-sample who gave a follow-up bracket
answer. An estimate for the fraction of people with household consumption less than $2000
in the total population of interest on the basis of sample I is 0.683*0.826+0.317*0.773=0.809.
Under the assumption that all answers are based upon the same initial estimates of consump-
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tion Ŷ , this estimate is consistent for the population fraction with Ŷ less than $2000 under
any form of selection into open-ended answers or follow-up brackets. The open-ended answers
(solid curve) might be negatively selected, so that follow-up bracket answers (long-dashed
curve) are positively selected.
The immediate bracket responses are, because of the random assignment, drawn from
the same population as the combined sample of open-ended and follow-up bracket respon-
dents (ignoring full non-respondents – see Section 6). If all answers are based on the same
initial estimates of the respondents, this implies that the distribution of immediate bracket
respondents should be a weighted average of the other two distributions in the figure. Figure
1 suggests this is not the case; the point estimate for sample II is only 0.688. In the next
section, we develop a formal test based upon this intuition, looking at these differences at
several entry points simultaneously.
4 Testing the Fixed-Point Model of Anchoring
A major distinction between the various anchoring models discussed in section 2 is their
implication for the first bracket question. The fixed-point model assumes that the entry
point acts as an anchor for later bracket questions but does not affect whether the amount is
larger or smaller than the entry point itself, and thus does not affect the answer to the first
bracket question. The same applies to any Bayesian model for anchoring: the first bracket
point leads to an update of prior information, but will not move the initial estimate – a mean
or other location measure of the respondent’s prior distribution – past the entry point. As
explained in section 2, the gating model, on the other hand, assumes that new errors can
be made at every bracket question, including the first one. This applies to the simple fixed
point gating model (see section 2) as well as the more advanced model of Hurd et al. (1998).
In the latter, explaining why the distribution shifts in the direction of the first entry point
even requires that larger errors are made in the first question than in later unfolding bracket
questions.
As shown in section 2 for the fixed probability gating model, gating reduces some prob-
abilities (those larger than 0.5) and increases other probabilities (those smaller than 0.5).
The same holds in the Hurd et al. (1998) model. On the other hand, since all the bracket
questions in the experiment are of the form “Is the amount E or more?” acquiescence al-
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Table 1. Distribution of Reported Consumption
Sample I: open-ended question first
E=500 E=1000 E=2000 All E
observations 674 698 725 2097
obs. open answer 435 485 496 1416
(percentage) (65.8) (71.2) (69.2) (68.3)
% of open answers
< 500 17.9 16.8 17.8 17.5
<1000 48.2 49.4 51.1 49.6
<2000 80.7 79.7 82.6 81.0
obs. bracket answer 239 213 229 681
(percentage) (34.2) (29.8) (30.8) (31.7)
% of bracket answers
<500 18.5 16.2 11.4
<1000 63.0 52.6 42.6
<2000 90.5 87.1 77.3
Sample II: forced brackets
E=500 E=1000 E=2000 E=5000
observations 690 612 582 778
% of bracket answers
< 500 15.9 11.6 7.0 5.4
<1000 55.7 40.9 29.9 31.0
<2000 84.1 83.7 68.8 64.2
<5000 98.2 98.9 97.5 94.2
Notes: respondents who answer no open question or
bracket question are not included (cf. Appendix A).
All percentages weighted with HRS provided sample weights.
ways goes in one direction: it leads to underestimation of P [Ŷ < E] and to overestimation of
P [Ŷ ≥ E], where Ŷ is the initial estimate not affected by the format of the bracket question.
If samples of open-ended answers and bracket answers drawn randomly from the same
population were available, the joint null hypothesis of no acquiescence bias and no anchoring
in the first bracket question could be tested by comparing fractions with P [Ŷ ≥ E] in
the open-ended answers with fractions answering “yes” to the bracket question whether the
amount is E or more in the sample of bracket answers. Moreover, the nature of the deviations
would indicate whether acquiescence or anchoring is the main problem. For example, at a low
entry point (with P [Ŷ ≥ E] > 0.5) anchoring according to the gating model would predict
that the fraction “yes” in the bracket answers is lower than P [Ŷ ≥ E] in the open-ended
answers, whereas yea-saying would predict the reverse.
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The reality of the experiment is more complicated. First, some respondents do not reveal
any information. In the sample of immediate bracket respondents (sample II), these are the
respondents that do not answer the first bracket question. In the sample of those who start
with an open-ended question (sample I), some people answer neither the open-ended nor
the first bracket question in the follow-up unfolding brackets design. In this section we will
consider the “best-case scenario” that the complete non-respondents are similar in the two
sub-samples: we assume that people who do not answer an initial bracket question would
also not have answered an open-ended question, and people who do not answer a follow-up
bracket question would not have answered the same bracket question either if it had been
preceded by an open-ended question. The population actually analyzed excludes the people
who do not reveal any information at all, and we assume that both samples (I and II) are
random samples from this population. Appendix A presents some information on complete
non-response for each group. It suggests there are no systematic differences between samples
I and II, backing up the assumption that is made. Moreover, in section 6 we show how the
assumption can be relaxed and look at “worst case scenarios.”
A second complication is the substantial number of respondents in sample I who do not
answer the open-ended question but do answer one or more follow-up bracket questions (cf.
Table 1). If giving an open-ended answer is non-random, ignoring the bracket respondents
in sample I leads to selection bias. The bracket responses in sample I may suffer from
similar anchoring or acquiescence biases as those in sample II. We will combine estimates
of P [Ŷ < E] for various entry point values in the sub-samples of open-ended and bracket
respondents in sample I and compare them with estimates on sample II. As explained in
section 3, we will not use the information in bracket questions other than the first one,
which would suffer from anchoring in any anchoring model. Under our null hypothesis,
answers to the first bracket question will not suffer from anchoring or yea-saying in either
group, and the difference between the sample I and II based estimates should be insignificant.
Under the alternative, both the sample I and the sample II based estimates will be affected
by anchoring or yea-saying. Since the majority of the sample I answers are open answers,
however, the anchoring or yea-saying effect is expected to be larger in sample II than in
sample I. This will drive the power of the test and helps to interpret deviations from the
null.
To make this more precise, first note that, as explained in section 1, we cannot say much
about the distribution of true consumption amounts, since we have only one (self-reported)
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amount per respondent. We focus on the respondent’s initial estimate Ŷi, which is reported
if the respondent gives an open-ended answer. Let O, B and N denote the events that an
open-ended answer, a bracket answer, or no answer at all is given, respectively. Let PI,E[.]
and PII,E[.] denote probabilities under the sample design of sample I or sample II with entry
point E. The assumption maintained in this section that full non-response is the same in
the two samples, is given by:
(A1) PI,E1 [N |Ŷ ] = PII,E2 [N |Ŷ ], E1, E2 = 500, 1000, 2000
Note that (A1) also implies that PI,E[N |Ŷ ] and PII,E[N |Ŷ ] do not depend on E. This will
be relaxed in section 6.
In the remainder of this section we consider the populations of those who would give a
bracket or an open-ended answer under the questionnaire design of samples I and II. Under
(A1), the distribution of Ŷ in these two populations is the same. What we want to test is
whether, in these populations, answers to bracket questions are exactly based on comparing
Ŷ to the entry point E. We cannot test this type of consistency at the individual level
(since there is only one observation per respondent), but we can test the implication for the
probabilities:
PJ,E[Ŷ < E|B] = PJ,E[“no”|B], E = 500, 1000, 2000; J = I, II (1)
where PJ,E[“no”|B] is the probability that the first bracket question (“is the amount E or
more?”) is answered with “no”.
If equation (1) is satisfied, then we have, for samples I and II, respectively:
PI,E[Ŷ < E|O or B] = PI,E[O|O or B]PI,E[Ŷ < E|O] + PI,E[B|O or B]PI,E[“no”|B].
and
PII,E[Ŷ < E|B] = PII,E[“no”|B]
Under assumption (A1), the probabilities PI,E[Ŷ < E|O or B] and PII,E[Ŷ < E|B] are equal.
This leads to the following null hypothesis, implied by (1):
H0 : PI,E[O|O or B]PI,E[Ŷ < E|O] + PI,E[B|O or B]PI,E[“no”|B] = PII,E[“no”|B] (2)
Under the alternative (and maintaining (A1)), PJ,E[Ŷ < E|B] will not be equal to
PJ,E[“no”|B], J = I, II. Since this affects only the minority of bracket respondents in
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sample I but everyone in sample II, the left hand side and right hand side of (2) will in
general not be equal under the alternative. The attenuation by open-ended responses makes
it likely that the left hand side of (2) is then closer to PI [Ŷ < E|O or B] = PII [Ŷ < E|B]
than the right hand side. This will help to determine the sign of the anchoring and/or
acquiescence bias.
The easiest way to implement the joint test for the three entry points E1=500, E2=1000
and E3=2000 is to formulate a model which has the magnitudes in (2) for the three entry
points as parameters and can be estimated by pseudo maximum likelihood (not using the
observations on full non-respondents and conditioning on this, and maintaining (A1), and
accounting for the sample design with clustering and sample weights, see, e.g., Skinner,
1989). A Wald test can then be performed on the three restrictions in (2), one restriction
for each entry point.
The parameters of the unrestricted model are given by:
ρI,O = PI [O|O or B], πI,O,1 = PI [Ŷ < 500|O], πI,O,2 = PI [Ŷ = 500|O], πI,O,3 = PI [500 <
Ŷ < 1000|O], . . .,πI,O,6 = PI [Ŷ = 2000|O];
πI,B,j = PI [“no” to “Is it Ej or more?”|B],j = 1, 2, 3, E1 = 500, E2 = 1000, E3 = 2000;
πII,j = PII [“no” to “Is it Ej or more?”|B],j = 1, 2, 3.
PI [Ŷ > 2000|O] is determined by the other parameters, since probabilities have to add
up to one. The three restrictions to be tested are
πII,j = ρI,OπI,O,j + (1− ρI,O)πI,B,j, j = 1, 2, 3.
Here we have imposed that PI [O|O or B] is the same across the different sub-groups of
sample I. This seems plausible a priori, for the same reason why assumption A1 is plausi-
ble: group assignment is completely random, and respondents choose whether to give an
open-ended answer or not before knowing their group assignment. Moreover, while Table 1
indicates some differences in the point estimates of this response rate across groups, these
differences are neither jointly nor pairwise significant at the 5% level. Still, we have also
performed the test with three different parameters for the open-ended response rates by
sub-group, with the same results.
The pseudo likelihood is presented in the appendix. The unrestricted ML estimates




Table 2 presents the unrestricted and restricted estimates using all continuous and bracket
respondents. The log likelihood difference implies that the null hypothesis is clearly rejected
at any common significance level. The bottom panel shows the implied estimates of PI [Ŷ <
E|O or B] under the null. Comparing these in the unrestricted model with the estimates of
πII,j, j = 1, . . . , 3, which are equal to PII [Ŷ < E|B] under the null, indicates why the null
is rejected. For E = 500, the estimates are not significantly different (t-test statistic: 0.8).
For E=1000, the sample I based estimate is significantly larger than the sample II estimate
(t-value: 3.2). Since $1000 is close to the median, it seems implausible that this is due to
gating (cf. section 2), but it could be due to acquiescence bias, with too many affirmative
answers to the question whether consumption is $1000 or more. The significant difference
at E=2000 (t-value: 3.0) with the same sign could be due to acquiescence bias as well as
gating, since gating typically increases the probability of an “extreme” outcome (2000 or
more, in this case) for bracket answers. Qualitatively, one interpretation of the results would
be a combination of acquiescence and gating. At E=500, the two effects are opposite and
almost cancel, apparently. For E=1000 there is not much gating, and acquiescence raises
the sample II estimate more than the sample I estimate, since sample II has bracket answers
only. For E=2000, gating and acquiescence reinforce each other, explaining the particularly
large difference at this entry point. On the other hand, the differences between the three
entry points may also be due to the fact that acquiescence is more important at higher
entry points, where more respondents should say “no” and are thus vulnerable to yea-saying
mistakes (cf. section 7).
According to Hurd (1999), acquiescence and anchoring become more important if respon-
dents are more uncertain about the actual amounts. Hurd (1999) analyzes experimental data
on asset holdings, and finds that the answers of the financial respondent - the person in the
household who is more knowledgeable in financial matters and answers most of the financial
questions - are hardly subject to acquiescence bias, while for others, acquiescence bias is
quite prominent. We checked whether this also applies to consumption by considering fi-
nancial respondents (almost 75% of the sample) and other respondents separately. Separate
estimates for both groups are not presented to save space. Our results differ from those of
Hurd (1999): The null hypothesis of no gating or acquiescence is rejected for both financial
respondents and others. For both groups, the pattern is similar as for the complete sample,
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with sample II estimates giving smaller reported probabilities of amounts lower than the
entry points. At the intermediate entry point E=$1000, the yea-saying effect seems smaller
for financial respondents than for others, with t-statistic 1.3 and 2.8, respectively. This is in
line with Hurd’s finding. But the t-statistics on the test at E=500 are 0.1 for financial re-
spondents and 0.8 for others, and at E=2000, they are 3.3 and 2.0, for financial respondents
and others, respectively. This suggests less clear differences between financial respondents
and others, possibly because of the other age group (Hurd looks at the younger HRS cohort)
or because financial respondents are better informed about asset values than others, but are
not necessarily better at estimating the value of total consumption.
Table 2: Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Unrestricted model Restricted model
Estimate St. error Estimate St. error
ρI,O PI [O|O or B] 0.6846 0.0168 0.6854 0.0166
πI,O,1 PI [Ŷ < 500|O] 0.1736 0.0161 0.1646 0.0148
πI,O,2 PI [Ŷ = 500|O] 0.0934 0.0081 0.0888 0.0078
πI,O,3 PI [500 < Ŷ < 1000|O] 0.2300 0.0150 0.2168 0.0143
πI,O,4 PI [Ŷ = 1000|O] 0.1433 0.0102 0.1450 0.0102
πI,O,5 PI [1000 < Ŷ < 2000|O] 0.1708 0.0111 0.1720 0.0115
πI,O,6 PI [Ŷ = 2000|O] 0.0733 0.0076 0.0832 0.0082
πI,B,1 PI [“no” to “Is it 500 or more?”|B] 0.1866 0.0291 0.1814 0.0282
πI,B,2 PI [“no” to “Is it 1000 or more?”|B] 0.5229 0.0416 0.4731 0.0388
πI,B,3 PI [“no” to “Is it 2000 or more?”|B] 0.7743 0.0290 0.7116 0.0308
πII,1 PII [“no” to “Is it 500 or more?”|B] 0.1596 0.0212 0.1699 0.0206
πII,2 PII [“no” to “Is it 1000 or more?”|B] 0.4135 0.0252 0.4711 0.0291
πII,j PII [“no” to “Is it 2000 or more?”|B] 0.6919 0.0293 0.7634 0.0200
Implied estimates:
PI [Ŷ < 500|O or B] under H0 0.1777 0.0213 0.1699 0.0206
PI [Ŷ < 1000|O or B] under H0 0.5052 0.0308 0.4711 0.0291
PI [Ŷ < 2000|O or B] under H0 0.7996 0.0209 0.7634 0.0200
Pseudo log likelihood: -5681.89 -5702.23
Wald test restrictions: 28.49 (p-value: 0.000)
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6 Relaxing the Assumptions about Full Non-response
Until now we have assumed that complete non-response is not selective, i.e., the respondents
in sample I who neither give an open-ended nor a bracket answer have the same distribution
of Ŷ as those in sample II who do not give any bracket answer. As explained in section 2,
we condition on participating in the experimental module and on not opting out before the
start of the consumption questions. This gives what we called samples I and II. In sample
I, 2.24% of all respondents answer “don’t know” or “refuse” to both the open-ended ques-
tion and the first follow-up bracket question. In sample II, 2.74% answer “don’t know” or
“refuse” to the first bracket question. Since the survey designs are systematically different
here - an open-ended question first versus forced brackets - selection into full non-response
might be different for the two samples. In this section we will investigate whether this could
explain the test results in the previous section. Thus we relax assumption (A1), replacing it
by an “assumption” implied by the random assignment into an experimental module:
(A2) PI,E1 [Ŷ < E] = PII,E2 [Ŷ < E]; E1, E2, E = 500, 1000, 2000
This assumption implies that we can omit the design subscripts in the probability distribution
of Ŷ . If there is no anchoring or acquiescence and (1) holds, we have, for sample design I:
P [Ŷ < E] = PI,E[O]PI,E[Ŷ < E|O] + PI,E[B]PI,E[“no”|B] + PI,E[N ]PI,E[Ŷ < E|N ].
Since no information is available to estimate PI,E[Ŷ < E|N ], this does not lead to a consistent
estimator of P [Ŷ < E] without further assumptions. Using that 0 ≤ PI,E[Ŷ < E|N ] ≤ 1,
however, gives lower and upper bounds on P [Ŷ < E] that can be consistently estimated
using sample I, similar to, for example, Manski (1989, 1995). The width between these
bounds is PI,E[N ].
Similarly, for sample design II we get, if (1) is valid:
P [Ŷ < E] = PII,E[B]PII,E[“no”|B] + PII,E[N ]PII,E[Ŷ < E|N ].
Using that 0 ≤ PII,E[Ŷ < E|N ] ≤ 1, this gives a lower bound and an upper bound on
P [Ŷ < E] that can be consistently estimated using sample II. A test of the null of no
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anchoring or acquiescence can be based upon comparing the two estimated bounding intervals
for the parameter P [Ŷ < E].
To avoid the complications of testing for several inequality restrictions simultaneously,
we consider only one entry point at the time. Moreover, given the result of the previous
section that sample I estimates of PI,E[Ŷ < E|O or B] are always larger than corresponding
sample II estimates PII,E[Ŷ < E|B] (suggesting that the alternative hypothesis should be
acquiescence rather than anchoring), we consider the estimate of the upper bound for sample
II, PUII [Ŷ < E] and the estimate for the lower bound for sample I, P
L
I [Ŷ < E] and perform
a one-sided test for the null hypothesis that the former is at least as large as the latter:
PLI [Ŷ < E] = PI,E[O]PI,E[Ŷ < E|O] + PI,E[B]PI,E[“no”|B].
PUII [Ŷ < E] = PII,E[B]PII,E[“no”|B] + PII,E[N ]
H0 : P
L
I [Ŷ < E] ≤ PUII [Ŷ < E]
This is in line with the intuition of Imbens and Manski (2004) who show that for a
two-sided confidence interval of a parameter identified up to a bounding interval, one-sided
significance levels can be used. To perform a t-test on the difference of the two probabilities,
note that both probabilities are expectations of dummy variables observed in sub-samples
(the first is a dummy with value 1 if there is an open-ended answer less than E or a bracket
answer “no” to the question “is the amount E or more?”, observed in the sub-sample of
sample I who got entry point E; the second is a dummy with value 1 if there is a bracket
answer “no” to the bracket question “Is the amount E or more?” or if the first bracket
question is not answered; this dummy is observed for everyone in sample II with entry point
E). The estimates of these expectations are the means of these dummies over the relevant
sub-samples (weighted with sample weights).
The results are summarized in Table 3. At E=500, the point estimates of the two
bounding intervals overlap, and the one-sided test cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
anchoring or acquiescence at E=500, a result we also obtained under assumption (A1). At
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Table 3: Test Results Allowing for Selective Non-response
E PLI [Ŷ < E] P
U
II [Ŷ < E] Difference St. error on diff.
500 0.1774 0.1880 -0.0106 0.0287
1000 0.4915 0.4253 0.0662 0.0361
2000 0.7943 0.6973 0.0970 0.0339
Notes: Weighted subsample fractions;
Standard errors corrected for clustering
E=$1000, the point estimates of the bounding intervals do not overlap. Even if all non-
respondents in sample II have low consumption and all full non-respondents in sample I
have high consumption, the estimate using sample II (0.425) remains below that for sample
I (0.491). The difference is significant at the one sided 5% level (t-value 1.83). In other
words, even if full non-respondents in the two samples are completely opposite groups (low
versus high consumption), we can reject the null hypothesis of no anchoring or acquiescence
at E=1000. Similarly, at E=$2000, the t-value on the difference is 2.86 and the null of no
anchoring or acquiescence is clearly rejected. We conclude that selective full non-response
cannot explain the finding that the no anchoring or acquiescence hypothesis is rejected.
7 Fixed Probability Gating and Acquiescence
To investigate whether gating or acquiescence bias (or both) can indeed explain why the
null hypothesis is rejected, we introduce a simple form of ”fixed probability” gating and
acquiescence bias. We maintain assumption (A1) in sections 4 and 5 and consider the
subpopulation of respondents who provide open-ended or bracket information. First, we
assume that there is a fixed fraction P [Acq] of the population that will automatically answer
any bracket question with “yes,” irrespective of Ŷ and E. Second, we assume that in the
remainder of the population, the bracket question triggers some people to deviate from their
initial estimate, and there is a fixed probability P [Gat] that people give the answer which is
opposite to their initial estimate (“yes” if Ŷ < E or “no” if Ŷ ≥ E). All this implies:
PJ [“yes” to “Is it E or more?”|B, Ŷ < E] = P [Acq] + (1− P [Acq])P [Gat], J = I, II
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and
PJ [“no” to “Is it E or more?”|B, Ŷ ≥ E] = (1− P [Acq])P [Gat]), J = I, II
For the symmetric case with P [Acq] = 0, this model is essentially the same as what Copas
(1988, p.234) calls “a simple model for resistant fitting.” The general case is similar to the
misclassification models used by, for example, Ekholm and Palmgren (1982), Lee and Porter
(1984), and Hausman et al. (1998).
The restricted model in Table 2 can be relaxed with fixed probability acquiescence and
anchoring, extending it with the probabilities P [Acq] and P [Gat]. This gives a model which is
nested in the unrestricted model, which has three parameters more than the restricted model
in Table 2, and thus one parameter more than the model with fixed probability acquiescence
and anchoring. Table 4 presents the estimates for the latter model, as well as for the models
that set either P [Acq] or P [Gat] to zero.
Pseudo log likelihoods are very similar for Models 1 and 3 in Table 4 and the unrestricted
model in Table 2. On the other hand, all three models in Table 4 are significantly better than
the restricted model in Table 2 allowing for neither acquiescence, nor gating. The probability
of gating is significant at the 10% level in model 2, but as soon as acquiescence is allowed
for also, gating no longer plays any role. Model 3 with a fixed probability of yea-saying and
without gating is the preferred model.
This corresponds to the estimates of P [Gat] and P [Acq]. In models 1 and 3, the estimate
of P [Acq] is substantial and significant. As soon as P [Acq] is allowed to be non-zero, the
estimate of P [Gat] is very small insignificant. The results thus suggest that yea-saying plays
a dominant role and explains why the null of no anchoring and no acquiescence is rejected
in sections 5 and 6. Once yea-saying is accounted for in a very simple one-parameter way,
there is no evidence of anchoring (or ”gating”) at the entry point.
Figure 2 compares the implications for the distribution of Ŷ of the three models in Table 4
and the restricted “benchmark” model without gating or acquiescence in Table 2. Compared
to the benchmark model, the model with gating implies a smaller dispersion in Ŷ , since some
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“extreme” bracket answers – “no” at E=$500; “yes” at E=$2000 – are explained by gating
instead of low or high values of Ŷ . While the benchmark model estimates directly reflect the
data, the gating model recognizes that part of the dispersion in the data is due to gating,
and corrects for that. Larger differences arise when acquiescence is allowed for. Once this is
done, also allowing for gating makes no difference: the two curves allowing for acquiescence
are virtually the same. Both imply lower estimates of consumption than the models not
allowing for acquiescence. The reason is that in the models allowing for acquiescence, some
of the “yes” answers to ‘ ‘Is it E or more?” are explained by yea-saying rather than high
values of consumption.
Table 4. Models with Fixed Acquiescence and/or Gating Probabilities
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Gating and Gating Acquiescence
Acquiescence only only
Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e.
ρI,O 0.6885 0.0167 0.6860 0.0168 0.6865 0.0167
πI,O,1 0.1746 0.0162 0.1618 0.0148 0.1756 0.0164
πI,O,2 0.0930 0.0080 0.0904 0.0079 0.0938 0.0081
πI,O,3 0.2264 0.0152 0.2204 0.0151 0.2269 0.0152
πI,O,4 0.1448 0.0104 0.1469 0.0105 0.1449 0.0102
πI,O,5 0.1716 0.0114 0.1739 0.0114 0.1711 0.0115
πI,O,6 0.0737 0.0077 0.0807 0.0087 0.0732 0.0077
πI,B,1 0.2434 0.0488 0.1138 0.0552 0.2465 0.0431
πI,B,2 0.6473 0.0578 0.4660 0.0439 0.6497 0.0800
πI,B,3 0.9928 0.0723 0.7636 0.0538 0.9912 0.0859
P [Gat] 0.0023 0.0430 0.0650 0.0448 0
P [Acq] 0.2144 0.0396 0 0.2144 0.0510
Implied estimates:
P [Ŷ < 500] 0.1960 0.0335 0.1467 0.0396 0.1978 0.0295
P [Ŷ < 1000] 0.5417 0.0406 0.4705 0.0323 0.5444 0.0541
P [Ŷ < 2000] 0.8670 0.0210 0.7840 0.0207 0.8683 0.0211
Pseudo Log likelihood -5682.37 -5700.22 -5682.44
Some theoretical arguments (Schuman and Presser, 1996, Chapter 8) and empirical find-
ings (e.g. Hurd, 1999) suggest that acquiescence bias should vary with the uncertainty about
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the quantities being queried. Table 5 shows the results of estimating model 3 in Table 4
(with acquiescence only) over a number of sub-samples. In almost all cases the estimated
acquiescence probability is substantial and its 95% confidence interval does not contain the
value zero. There is some variation across subgroups, and most results are in line with the
notion that people who are more uncertain have a larger probability of acquiescence. For
example, financial respondents and respondents with high education level are less subject to
yea-saying than others. Respondents who are not the financial respondent in their house-
hold have a particularly large acquiescence probability. Using a self-reported indicator or
a test-based indicator of memory quality, we find that people with better memory are less
subject to yea-saying. There is only a weak relation between age or gender and the tendency
of yea-saying. The income and wealth patterns seem somewhat surprising, with the higher
income and higher wealth respondents more subject to yea-saying. Perhaps this is because
their consumption expenditures are more diversified and harder to estimate.
8 Conclusions
We have investigated the importance of anchoring and acquiescence bias at the entry point
of an unfolding bracket design. Experimental data on consumption where respondents are
randomly either given an open-ended question on household consumption or immediately
directed to bracket questions were used to test for the presence of these phenomena, without
making specific model assumptions. The main finding is that some bias is present even at the
entry point. Further analysis making additional assumptions on the nature of acquiescence
and gating suggests that acquiescence bias is the main problem, while anchoring is less
important. The evidence is stronger than that of Hurd et al. (1999) in the sense that
we also find acquiescence among financial respondents, the most knowledgeable household
members concerning financial matters. For the consumption question at hand, accounting
for selective non-response but ignoring acquiescence leads to misleading conclusions on the
selective nature of item non-response. It would lead to overestimation of consumption levels
and underestimation of poverty rates.
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Table 5. Estimated Probabilities of Acquiescence - Model 3
(Model with fixed acquiescence probability, without gating)
sub-sample # obs. P [Acq]
Estimate St. error
Financial respondent 3548 0.161 0.044
Not financial respondent 1211 0.439 0.066
Borne after 1919 2088 0.233 0.061
Borne before 1920 2671 0.208 0.045
Woman 3111 0.233 0.047
Man 1648 0.195 0.110
Years education >12 1445 0.160 0.092
Years education ≤12 3314 0.208 0.040
Above median household income 2361 0.288 0.062
Below or at median household income 2397 0.152 0.040
Above median household wealth 2354 0.272 0.057
Below or at median household wealth 2365 0.145 0.041
Self-rated memory high 1494 0.083 0.071
Self-rated memory low 3265 0.274 0.036
Memory test high 1700 0.151 0.067
Memory test low 3058 0.255 0.050
All 4759 0.214 0.051
Notes:
Missing income and wealth imputed (RAND version C);
Wealth is total wealth (including housing and IRAs).
Self-rated memory: “How would you rate your memory at the
present time?” Possible answers: excellent, very good, good, fair
or poor. High: excellent or very good.
Memory test: number immediately recalled from a list of 40 words
read to the respondent. High: at least 6 (the maximum was 10).
Reducing acquiescence bias in data collection is easy: the bracket questions can be for-
mulated in a neutral way, asking people, for example, to choose between “more than E,”,
“less than E,” or “about E,” rather than to answer “yes” or “no”. This has already been
implemented in the most recent waves of, for example, the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) and AHEAD. The results of this study suggest that, with these improved questions,
it seems at least safe to use the first bracket question in an unfolding bracket design at face
value. Given the evidence in the literature that anchoring is a problem also in absence of
acquiescence bias, this at the same time means that anchoring at follow up bracket ques-
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tions must be taken seriously. The fixed point model for anchoring or another model with
Bayesian learning in which answers to the later bracket questions are affected by the entry
point may then be a useful tool.
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Appendix A: Details on Complete Non-Response
Table A1 gives an overview of complete item non-response in the consumption question. It
concerns the 4885 respondents who were willing to answer the questions in the experimental
module and did not interrupt the interview before reaching the first consumption question.
Those who were not willing (1173 observations) or interrupted the interview (43 observations)
are excluded.
Table A1. Complete Non-response Rates By Experimental Module
Module Number of observations Non-response rate
Open-ended, E=500 693 2.58%
Open-ended, E=1000 714 2.23%
Open-ended, E=2000 742 1.95%
Forced bracket, E=500 709 3.45%
Forced bracket, E=1000 631 2.71%
Forced bracket, E=2000 602 3.08%
Forced bracket, E=5000 795 1.85%
Total 4885 2.52%
Notes: Percentages weighted with sample weights.
”Open-ended” respondents first get an open-ended question and go into brackets if
they do not answer this; ”Forced bracket” respondents only get bracket questions.
Non-response rate: those who do not answer any open-ended or bracket question.
Non-response rates vary from 1.95% to 3.45%. The differences between the seven groups
are insignificant (the design-based Pearson F-test on independence has a p-value of 0.582).
The difference between those who start with an open-ended question and those who start
with a bracket question is insignificant also (p-value 0.290), so that there is no evidence
that complete non-response is related to the question format, supporting assumption A1 in
section 4.
We have also checked whether complete non-response is correlated with some household
or individual characteristics. We found no relation between non-response and, for example,
age, education level, gender, race, or marital status. We found that financial respondents,
i.e., the household members most knowledgeable in financial matters and answering the
household income and household assets questions in the core interview, had significantly
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lower non-response (1.97%) than other household members (4.29%).
Appendix B: Likelihood Contributions
This appendix presents the pseudo likelihood contributions for the model in section 4. They
are pseudo likelihood contributions in the sense that clustering is not taken into account,
the maximized log likelihood is the weighted sum of contributions of individual observations,
see Skinner (1989). Full non-respondents are discarded. Likelihood contributions vary with
the design (sub-sample I or sub-sample II; entry point E1=500, E2=1000 or E3=2000, and
the outcomes: open-ended answer or bracket answer; category containing the open-ended
answer; “no” or “yes” to the first bracket question. The possible likelihood contributions
are listed below.
Table A1. Likelihood Contributions Unrestricted Model Section 4
Sub-sample I, open-ended answer with amount <500: ρI,OπI,O,1
Sub-sample I, open-ended answer with amount 500 ρI,OπI,O,2
Sub-sample I, open-ended answer with amount >500 and < 1000 ρI,OπI,O,3
Sub-sample I, open-ended answer with amount 1000 ρI,OπI,O,4
Sub-sample I, open-ended answer with amount >1000 and < 2000 ρI,OπI,O,5
Sub-sample I, open-ended answer with amount 2000 ρI,OπI,O,6
Sub-sample I, open-ended answer with amount >2000 ρI,O(1−
∑6
k=1 πI,O,k)
Sub-sample I, entry point Ej , bracket answer “no”, j = 1, 2, 3 (1− ρI,O)πI,B,j
Sub-sample I, entry point Ej , bracket answer “yes”, j = 1, 2, 3 (1− ρI,O)(1− πI,B,j)
Sub-sample II, entry point Ej , bracket answer “no”, j = 1, 2, 3 πII,j
Sub-sample II, entry point Ej , bracket answer “yes”, j = 1, 2, 3 (1− πII,j)
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